Abstract. This paper studies the effects of desynchronization attacks such as delay and warping on the performance of blind spread-spectrum watermark detection systems. The host signal is modeled as a colored Gaussian signal. Evaluation of the optimal likelihood ratio test is often computationally expensive, so as a practical alternative, we propose a family of quadratic detectors and construct the detector and family of watermarks that maximize the deflection criterion. Experiments are carried out to verify the suitability of the deflection as a performance index. Substantial improvements over conventional watermark designs are demonstrated.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of detecting a known watermark w originally embedded in a host signal s. The watermarked signal z = s + 'w is subjected to attacks. The corrupted signal y is made available to the watermark detector, together with the reference watermark 'W. It is known that desynchronization attacks such as unknown delays and warping (time-varying delay) can disable empirically designed detectors [I] . A natural approach to combat such attacks is to formulate watermark detection as a composite hypothesis testing problem. This paper extends our recent work on white Gaussian hosts [2] and constructs a detector and a family of watermarks that are computationally tractable and satisfy optimality properties under warping attacks. The theory is however general enough to be applicable to a larger list of attacks.
MATHEMATICAL MODEL
For mathematical convenience, we assume that all signals are discrete-time and periodic with period equal to N . The
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The special case of a white Gaussian host was considered in [Z] . Unlike the setup in [2], here we consider a random watermark, because this increases the system security. The watermark considered is a zero-mean random signal, with covariance matrix R,, to be designed. The warping function B(n), 1 5 n, 5 A', is real-valued and slowly-varying. By s(n-B(n)) andw(n -O(n)) wedenote the resampled versions of the underlying continuous-timc warped signals.
The detection problem can be formulated as a composite hypothesis test [31:
We assume that the statistics of s(n) are indistinguishable from those of s ( n -8 ( n ) ) , otherwise the host signal itself would serve as a synchronization signal. Hence, we study the hypothesis test
{ which serves as an approximation to the original detection problem.
ANALYSIS OF WARPING ATTACKS

Coherent Detector
If the warping function 6'(n), 1 5 n 5 A' was known, we would have a coherent detection problem [3] . The likelihood ratio test (LRT) compares the linear statistic CO with a threshold q: 
Quadratic Noncoherent Detector
When 0 is unknown, a suboptimal hut often good approach to noncoherent detection consists of using a quadratic de-
where K is an N x N symmetric matrix, and 7 is the threshold of the test.
Deflection Criterion
Assume the N-vector B is random over [0, NI", with a distribution ~( 0 ) .
and is independent of s(n), 1 5 n 5 A' .
Computing the first two moments of Z in (7) under H o and HI, we obtain
where R,,,, is an N x N watermark autocorrelation matrix with entries After some algebra, the variance of Z under H o is
The threshold of the test (7) satisfies
We define the deflection criterion (also called generalized SNR) for quadratic detection as [SI (13) This criterion would determine the probability of error of the test (7) if the distributions of Z under Ho and H I were Gaussian. In problems such as ours, it only serves as a tractable measure of separability of the two distributions: higher values of the deflection are expected to lead to lower error probabilities. It can be shown that d' is maximized by 'R,,,R;' (14) where N is an arbitrary nonzero constant. The maximum value of the deflection for the optimal kemel K is:
Remark. The mean-square average of c g in (3) is:
where M = R;lRw,TR;l. Comparing with (14), we conclude that (16) is an optimal quadratic decision statistic.
Optimal Watermark Design
The use of d 2 as a performance criterion for quadratic detection also suggests its use as a criterion for watermarkdesign. The criterion d2 depends on the statistics of the watermark only via its correlation matrix R,.
The watermark should he imperceptible, so we constrain its average energy per sample: The maximization of (15) subject to the constraint of (17) and the constraint B,,,, E ' R, , , , , , (as defined below (IO)) must generally be done numerically. However, a useful up- In other words, all the available power is assigned to one single eigenvaluecorrespondingto Xs,,in. The upper hound on the deflection can he achieved only if R;,r E R,3n.
However, in general, it is not always possible to construct a feasible R,,,. that achieves this upper bound. A case of interest, shown in Example 2, is when R, is circulant Toeplitz and a feasible P,3T can he generated.
Once a feasible RL,= is found, we still need to find a corresponding correlation matrix R;,. Equation (IO) defines a linear mapping R& = &RL. Any R, E L; '(Rw,,) is therefore optimal. Example 1. A case of practical interest, where R.; can be found easily from R&, occurs when the attack is a simple delay that is uniformly distributed, and R , and P,,n are circulant Toeplitz. In this case, the choice R; = fl,,-satisfies (IO). For example, the watermark w ( n ) could he generated as a Gaussian signal with zero mean and correlation matrix RL = Example 2. Consider a warping attack satisfying the conditions of footnote 1 and assume again that R , and fl,,T are circulant Toeplitz. Then R,;T is circulant Toeplitz. We seek R, that satisfies:
where pk-k' is the distribution of B(k) -S(k'). A circulant Toeplitz solution R, is guaranteed to exist.
Detectability/Security Tradeoff. In an actual watermarking application, it may be desirable to spread the watermark power over several eigenvectors to increase the system's security. For instance, let the power he equally distributed among the weakest L eigenvectors of the host, i:e,, the power allocated to each channel is X,(k) = N u i / L , where 1 5 k 5 L. In that case we have If As(k), 1 5 k 5 L , are all equal, (23) is achieved with equality. The deflection decreases when the available watermark power is distributed among many channels of the host. Thus, there is a trade-off between detectability and security.
Example 3. Consider a uniformly distributed delay attack and a periodic and stationary AR (1) optimal watermark is a sinusoid with frequency T . The watermark power could also he assigned to two eigenvalues to increase the system security and also ensure that the resulting watermarkis real-valued. Then, if X,(k) = X, (N -k) for k # 0, k # N / 2 , w ( n ) becomes a real sinusoidal watermark at frequency 27ik/N, and d' = $: *. Similarly, the watermark power can he equally distributed among an even number of the eigenvalues to further increase the system security, hut at the cost of a lower d2. The resulting watermarks will he sums ofsinusoids at the frequencies chosen.
NUMERICAL RESULTS
We performed several experiments and evaluated the performance of our design numerically, in terms of the deflection criterion and the probability of error (which as mentioned earlier is not a function of the deflection criterion) under different choices of the kernel and different choices of the watermark. Monte-Carlo runs (averaging over all random variables) were used to determine empirical probabilities of error. In order to draw reliable and generally applicable conclusions, we considered watermarks of varying strength, parameterized by the ratio of the maximum host power to the maximum watermark power. The ratio U , ' / . ; was in the range of 8 to 20 dB. We considered a length N = 400 periodic Gaussian AR(1) host with zero mean, unit variance and p = 0.98 displayed in Fig. I Fig. I) . The optimal watermark under this setup is sinusoidal with frequency 71, as all the power is allocated to X,(N/2). Experiments were also conducted to compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the optimal kernel K of (14) and with K = R, (which would be optimal for a white host 121). As Fig. 2(a) shows, the value of the deflection indeed decreases when the suboptimal kernel is used, suggesting that the distributions under H o and H I are less separated than they are when the optimal kernel is used. Consequently, the error probability is expected to increase. Indeed, Fig. 2(h) shows that use of the optimal kernel leads to significantly lower error probabilities (ranging from 0.005 to 0.2 instead of 0.01 to 0.45). The error probability for the coherent detector (which knows the warping function and serves as an oracle) is also shown in mark, designed following Section 3.2.2, with one generated ,.. from a suboptimal covariance R , with the same structure as R,. The watermark is statistically similar to the host signal. ".' Fig. 3 shows that the deflection increases and the probability of error decreases when an optimal watermark is hidden. Vol. 14, No. 6, pp. 802-805, 1966 . I11 -56
